UNIVERSITAS SCIENTIARUM SZEGEDIENSIS

SZEGEDI TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM

Anomalies of Generalization in Machine Learning

Jelasity Márk

University of Szeged

Supervised learning is curve fitting on data

$p(\text{cica}|x) = \frac{1}{2}$

$p(\text{cica}|x) > \frac{1}{2}$

$p(\text{cica}|x) < \frac{1}{2}$

Supervised learning is curve fitting on data

- Good-old-fashioned AI used to (try to) utilize (symbolic) knowledge
- Nowadays we simply fit a non-linear function (with possibly millions of parameters) on the data
  - The function is often a composition of many similar layers (hence “deep networks”)
- The idea is very similar for all applications
  - Images, text, game-playing AI, robot control, etc
- The data lives in a very high dimensional space
- There are many important issues with this data centric approach

Oversimplified, fully connected architecture:

$$p(y|x;\theta) = (f_n \circ \cdots \circ f_2 \circ f_1)(x;\theta)$$

$$f_i(x) = \max(0, A_i x, +b_i)$$

$$f_n(x) = \mathrm{softmax}(A_n x + b_n)$$



Are Large Models a Good Idea?

- In a sense, yes
  - Double descent phenomenon
  - Empirical evidence (LLMs, generative models)
- In a sense, no
  - Out-of-distribution (unfamiliar) inputs can be labeled wrong very confidently
  - Inconsistent, counterintuitive behavior can appear
  - Very small changes in the inputs can cause very large changes in the output (maybe a special case of inconsistency)
  - These issues are much harder to handle for huge obscure models

Traditional View: bias-variance tradeoff

- Bias: the error (risk) of the model over the training data
- Variance: the error over test data
- The traditional view is that that there is a sweet spot before the interpolation threshold



Belkin et al: Reconciling modern machine learning practice and the bias-variance trade-off

Double Descent Phenomenon



- Empirical evidence suggests there is a second descent of variance after the interpolation threshold

Belkin et al: Reconciling modern machine learning practice and the bias-variance trade-off

Double Descent Phenomenon

- The phenomenon can be observed both in time and along model capacity



Nakkiran et al: Deep double descent: where bigger models and more data hurt

Double descent

- It works even for linear regression
- Vector a is the pseudo inverse of matrix Φ containing the features of the examples in its rows
- Turns out increasing N (# of features) helps generalization



$$h(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{N} a_k \phi(x; v_k)$$

Explanations of DD in Capacity

- Implicit bias
  - Despite the large capacity of large models, the model selection process (training through SGD) prefers models that generalize well, if model is large
    - Eg GD can be proven to converge to the pseudo-inverse in linear models, which is the minimal norm model
- Number of parameters is not the same as complexity
  - There is a model capacity part and a smoothing part
  - First we increase capacity then we increase only smoothing (at which point generalization improves)

Curth et al: A U-turn on Double Descent: Rethinking Parameter Counting in Statistical Learning

DD in time

- Double descent can be observed also as a function of time (training epochs)
- One possible explanation is that different parts of the neural network have a different time-scale for the bias-variance tradeoff, and this is superimposed

Heckel and Yilmaz, Early stopping in deep networks: double descent and how to eliminate it

Moving on to potential problems

- Out-of-distribution (unfamiliar) inputs can be labeled wrong very confidently
- Inconsistent, counterintuitive behavior can appear
- Very small changes in the inputs can cause very large changes in the output (maybe a special case of inconsistency)

Out-of-distribution inputs

- It is the case when p(x) is very small
  - Unfamiliar inputs
- In the data centric approach it is very hard to give examples of “everything else”…
- So “everything else” will be messed up



Out-of-distribution inputs



Figure 5. Indirectly encoded, thus regular, images that LeNet believes with 99.99% confidence are digits 0-9. The column and row descriptions are the same as for Fig. 4.



Figure 4. Directly encoded, thus irregular, images that LeNet believes with 99.99% confidence are digits 0-9. Each column is a digit class, and each row is the result after 200 generations of a randomly selected, independent run of evolution.

Nguyen et al: **Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images**

OOD for AlphaZero

Adversarial policies beat superhuman go AIs Krause et al

- Here, a strategy is a convolutional neural network trained based on (self-generated) data
- Adversarial strategies can be trained for a fixed superhuman agent
  - These exploit the fact that some kinds of (mostly weak) positions rarely come up in self-play during training
- These strategies can be interpretable and playable by humans
  - Eg Cyclic groups in Go
- These strategies can easily be beaten by humans



“cyclic-adversary wins as white by capturing a cyclic group (×) that the victim (Latest, 10 million visits) leaves vulnerable”

OOD for Large Language Models

Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models.
Zou et al

- A large language model is also a neural network trained to predict the next word of arbitrary texts
- We can find an OOD string to be appended to a harmful request
  - The method can even be transferable to different LLMs
- This results in beating the “alignment” based defense and we can generate harmful content



Inconsistent behavior

- We usually have some trivial background knowledge such as
  - The mirror image of a dog is also a dog
- A data centric approach will always have exceptions
  - inputs that are blatantly incorrectly predicted
  - Not many but these inputs are possible to find by an adversary



Inconsistent behavior

Evaluating Superhuman Models with Consistency Checks Fluri et al





Very small changes with very large effect

- Part of our background knowledge is that an invisible or unnoticeable (by a human) perturbation should not change the output
- A data centric approach will always have exceptions to this as well!
  - Random perturbations are usually not a problem
  - But adversarial perturbations are easy to find by an adversary for every normal input!



Small changes making a big difference

Milla Jovovich

Accessorize to a Crime: Real and Stealthy Attacks on State-of-the-Art Face Recognition
Sharif et al

Wearable accessories (top left)
Stickers (top right)
One pixel modified (bottom right)

45 mph speed limit

Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification
Eykholt et al

Green light

Feature-Guided Black-Box Safety Testing of Deep Neural Networks
Wicker et al



Small changes making a big difference

Are AlphaZero-like Agents Robust to Adversarial Perturbations? Lan et al

Adversarial examples for AlphaZero-like agents

(a) KataGo plays black at E1 ♦ before perturbation.

(b) KataGo plays black at E11 ♦ after adding two meaningless stones marked as 1 and 2.

Invisible changes making a big difference

Right column according to neural network is all

Ostriches!



Intriguing properties of neural networks

Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, Rob Fergus

Examples from other domains



Audio Adversarial Examples: Targeted Attacks on Speech-to-Text
Carlini, Wagner

Generating Natural Language Adversarial Examples
Alzantot et al

Original Text Prediction = **Negative**. (Confidence = 78.0%)
*This movie had **terrible** acting, **terrible** plot, and **terrible** choice of actors. (Leslie Nielsen ...come on!!!) the one part I **considered** slightly funny was the battling FBI/CIA agents, but because the audience was mainly **kids** they didn't understand that theme.*
Adversarial Text Prediction = **Positive**. (Confidence = 59.8%)
*This movie had **horrific** acting, **horrific** plot, and **horrifying** choice of actors. (Leslie Nielsen ...come on!!!) the one part I **regarded** slightly funny was the battling FBI/CIA agents, but because the audience was mainly **youngsters** they didn't understand that theme.*

The problem

- On some input examples AI models make decisions that are
  - Very confident
  - Very clearly wrong
- Not only classification!



Security implications

- Robustness of intelligent control systems
  - Self-driving vehicles
  - Industry 4.0 systems
  - Smart-city infrastructure
  - Autonomous weapon systems!
- Bypassing defense solutions
  - Biometric identification
  - Intrusion detection



Köszönöm a figyelmet!